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Received 17 May 2005; received in revised form 29 October 2005; accepted 11 November 2005AbstractObjective: To understand how views and approaches concerning risks and benefits may be affected by dynamic contexts and processes related
to clinical roles and relationships.
Methods: We conducted two in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 50 doctors who became patients due to serious illnesses, concerning
their experiences before and after diagnosis.
Results: As patients, these doctors gained critical new insights into the processes and contexts of communication about risks and benefits.
Doctors and patients often varied in how they viewed and weighed risks and benefits (e.g., as ‘‘good’ or ‘‘bad’’). These data suggest a model in
which patients undergo several dynamic processes: seeking statistics, accepting doctors’ framing of statistics, being influenced by media
hype, seeing statistics as relevant or not, over-valuing risks, weighing the importance of risks and benefits, interpreting statistics as good or
bad, accepting or denying statistics and odds, and making treatment decisions. These processes are affected by external factors (e.g., doctors
ordering tests, framing statistics, and often over- versus under-valuing risks), and internal factors (e.g., depression, denial of illness, optimism
versus pessimism, magical thinking – that doctors are immune to disease – and rationalizations).
Conclusions: Doctors and patients are engaged in complex, dynamic processes that shape patients’ approaches toward risks and benefits.
Practice Implications: These data highlight the need for increased attention toward these issues in medical educational and care.
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Patient comprehension of risk-benefit information takes
place in the context of dynamic processes and relationships,
but the effects and implications of these have been seriously
understudied. Subjective factors that mold perceptions of
statistics have been explored in several other fields, such as
economics, but have been less examined in medicine.
Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics for
suggesting that individuals commonly view probabilities
subjectively, using biases and heuristics. For example,
prospect theory suggests that ‘‘the response to losses is more
extreme than the response to gains’’ [1]. In addition, the
psychological ‘‘availability’’ and ‘‘retrievability’’ of exam-* Tel.: +1 212 740 7324; fax: +1 212 740 3508.
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over-weigh rare, but traumatically-experienced outcomes
[2]. Several psychological studies have probed such
misperceptions of statistics—generally among college
students and regarding hypothetical situations. For instance,
research has shown that the interpretation of statistical
information is affected by how it is framed, either positively
or negatively [3], In addition, numerical estimates convey
data more effectively than verbal descriptions alone [4].
In medicine, physicians and patients commonly confront
significant uncertainties [5]. In these situations, biases and
heuristics may distort patients’ perceptions of risks [6].
Healthcare professionals can also present risks in varying
ways. For example, research has shown that genetic
counselors use a wide range of verbal descriptions [7].
Though different groups of medical personnel assign similar
quantitative probabilities to qualitative description of odds.
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interpreting these words (e.g., ‘‘likely’’ versus ‘‘unlikely’’)
[8]. Even when using numbers rather than verbal descrip-
tions, patients may assess risks differently if presented rates
rather than proportions [9]. The order in which risks and
benefits are present can also influence responses [10].
Though some cognitive strategies used in medical
decision-making have been explored [11,12], less attention
has been paid to how dynamic factors and processes may
shape the communication, interpretation, and understanding
of risk/benefit information. Numerous interpersonal sub-
jective factors may be involved in presentations and
interpretations of risks and benefits, related to contexts
and dynamic interactions of doctors and patients.
Doctors who become patients have received some
attention, primarily focusing on single, anecdotal reports
[13–16], and issues of self-doctoring [17,18]. Anecdotally,
they have been forced to experience medical care from a
different position, and thus come to see aspects of medicine
from another perspective in ways that challenge their
preconceived beliefs and expectations. But scant attention
has been paid to how they view or alter their views of
doctor–patient communication about risks and benefits.
These doctor-patients are potentially unique and important
in their ability to elucidate contrasts between the views and
approaches of each group toward risks and benefits, having
uniquely occupied both roles. They can elucidate issues that
they were not previously aware of, but now recognize. Key
questions thus arise, such as what perspectives and insights
these doctor-patients arrive at, and how these relate to
aspects of recent decision-making theory (e.g., by Kahne-
man and Tversky and others) [1,2,12].2. Methods
Pilot interviews were conducted, leading to the devel-
opment and refinement of an interview guide. For the full
study, subjects were recruited through emailed announce-
ments (e.g., stating, ‘‘Are you or do you know a physician
with a serious illness?’’), websites, word of mouth, and ads
in newsletters. As a result, the principal investigator (PI) was
contacted by potential participants, including 48 doctors, 1
dentist, and 1 medical student who had become patients due
to serious illnesses (referred to below as ‘‘doctors’’). With
each participant, two in-depth, semi-structured interviews of
2 h were held concerning experiences before and after
diagnosis. Serious illness was self-defined, and then
confirmed by the PI, a trained psychiatrist. Of these
participants, 27 were HIV positive, and 23 had other medical
problems (e.g., cancer, heart disease, and hepatitis). Ages
ranged from 25 to 87, all were Caucasian, except for 1
Latino doctor, 40 were men, and 10 were women; and they
were interviewed in several cities. The PI conducted all the
interviews at participants’ homes or offices, or in his
office—whatever was more convenient for them. Partici-pants were asked about experiences as patients and as
providers, and about other aspects of their lives.
The interviews were audiotaped, transcribed, and
content-analyzed, informed by grounded theory [19]. Initial
analyses were conducted during the period in which the
interviews were being held. A research team, composed of
the principal investigator and a research assistant, examined
a subset of interviews to assess factors that shaped
participants’ experiences, identifying categories of recurrent
themes and issues that were subsequently given codes. A
senior consultant with expertise in qualitative research
provided input at several stages of this coding process. The
team assessed similarities and differences between partici-
pants, examining categories that emerged, ranges of
variation within categories, and variables that may be
involved. A coding manual was developed, and areas of
disagreement were examined until consensus was reached.
New themes that did not fit into this original coding
framework were discussed, and modifications were made in
the manual when deemed appropriate. In phase two of the
analysis, the research team refined, merged, or subdivided
thematic categories into secondary or sub-codes, when
suggested by associations or overlap in the data. These codes
and sub-codes were then used in analysis of all of the
interviews. To ensure coding reliability, all interviews were
analyzed by two coders.
The study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at Columbia University and the NY State Psychiatric
Institute.3. Results
These doctor-patients revealed a range of issues and
problems as described below. Overall, their views and
approaches toward risks and benefits appeared to be part of a
process and were shaped by interpersonal, psychological,
and temporal contexts. Heuristics and biases emerged in a
variety of ways within these complicated interpersonal
dynamics and processes that evolved over time.
Themes arose reflecting experiences as patients them-
selves, and as doctors treating other patients. They felt that
their experiences as patients: were generally shared with lay
patients, but, as noted below, at times, were more unique to
doctor-patients. Invariably however, even themes that
appeared in some ways specific to doctor-patients reflected
larger underlying issues and concerns that lay patients
shared as well. As illustrated on Fig. 1, the themes that
emerged suggest a model, concerning factors involved in
views and approaches toward risk and benefit information.
3.1. Experiences as patients
3.1.1. Framing of statistics
Many of these doctors became more aware of, and
sensitive to, how statistics were framed within the context of
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Fig. 1. Social, psychological, and temporal factors involved in views of risks and benefits.doctor–patient relationships—not only what the statistics
were, but also how they were presented. In particular,
they felt providers’ lack of empathy shaped presentations
and thus perceptions of risk-benefit information. For
example, one surgeon described how the night before his
surgery, he was told by his physician that he had, ‘‘a 5%
chance of dying.’’ He reported, ‘‘That night I couldn’t
sleep. If I had been told instead that I had a 95% chance of
surviving, I would have slept better.’’ Surprise arose
among these doctors concerning the need to frame data
appropriately – i.e. as positively or negatively – and thus
the extent to which emotions affected perceptions of risks
and benefits.
These doctors became more aware, too, of the disparity
between cognitive information, and emotional needs for
support and reassurance. As one internist said, ‘‘I was
surprised that I was as shocked and numb as I was when I
found out I was HIV positive.’’ Routinely, he had told
patients who tested positive, ‘‘we don’t know what the test
means exactly, and there are good treatments—many
patients do well for many years.’’ But now having been
diagnosed with HIV himself, none of these approaches felt
helpful. Previously, he had viewed statistical and prognostic
information as beneficial. He now felt that many physicians
overvalued such information as almost ‘‘magically’’
therapeutic in and of itself, reflecting a sense of control
over an illness. As patients, these doctors were surprised athow frequently they received ‘‘cold’’ presentations of data,
yet they had difficulty conveying to their physicians desires
for more emotional support.
3.1.2. Interpreting statistics: over- versus under-valuing
risks
Tensions emerged as well concerning under- versus
over-valuing risks. Generally, these doctor-patients felt that
medical training increased their ability to access, under-
stand, and interpret risk and benefit information. They felt
they had ‘‘learned from clinical experience’’ – specifically
that they had ‘‘gotten comfortable with risk,’’ and ‘‘knew
what the statistics meant’’ (i.e., that the existence of a
danger did not necessarily mean that that untoward event
would occur). They cited a common adage of medical
training to temper biases in assessments of risks and
overvaluation of the possibility of a negative outcome:
‘‘Common things happen commonly. Uncommon things
happen uncommonly. You see the zebra diagnoses’’ –
medical conditions that are rare, but nonetheless described
in detail in medical textbooks – ‘‘only once in a blue
moon.’’
In contrast, these doctors generally thought that lay
patients ‘‘tend to get hung up on risks of complications’’—
that is feeling that a percentage likelihood of a complication
happening means they will get it. Many of these doctor-
patients believed they were less wary of risks of medications
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3.1.3. Seeking and evaluating statistics
Among these respondents, feelings arose that lay
patients did not evaluate critically enough claims in the
media and ‘‘media hype’’ about treatment and research
findings. Some of these doctors felt that they, compared to
patients, knew how to evaluate the research—not assuming
that they would magically overcome the odds. (e.g., ‘‘I look
at the literature, whereas other peoplemay think theywill be
the exception.’’) Feelings emerged that, in fact, ‘‘the
literature lies’’—in part because only confirmatory results
get published.
These doctor-patients varied in the extent to which they
sought statistics related to their diseases. Though a few
handled the intense anxiety of having a serious disease by
‘‘trying not to think about it,’’ most sought to gather as much
scientific data as possible, immediately checking on-line for
information.
3.1.4. Statistics as relevant or not
Questions arose as well concerning the potential lack of
‘‘generalizability’’ of medical research: in estimating
prognoses, research findings refer to group means, but not
individual patients. Hence, at times these doctors felt that the
applicability and generalizability of statistics to their own
disease was open to interpretation. They felt that statistics
helped physicians make decisions in general, but that for any
patient, the relevant N = 1. Thus, doctor-patients often did
not ‘identify’ with these statistics, or feel these were relevant
to them. Rationally, they knew that they were likely to
follow the mean. But often, they came to realize more than
before the potential limitations of medical knowledge, and
that statistics may not be relevant.
Relatedly, patients’ common questions of, ‘‘What would
you do if you were me, doctor?’’ and, ‘‘What would you do if
your mother was the patient?’’ were now seen as reflecting
patients’ efforts to apply population-based data to their own
individual cases. Here, too, the interpretations of statistics
had implications for treatment decisions, as well, in deciding
how to act on risk information.
3.1.5. Weighing risks
These doctors now questioned, too, how to weigh risks.
Specifically, a physician may recognize the existence of
risk of a particular side effect, but weigh the importance of
that risk differently than would a patient. For example, as
patients themselves, many doctors perceived and appre-
ciated their patients’ side effects more, factoring in not just
the therapeutic effects, but the psychological and social
costs and suffering of side effects of treatments that, these
doctors now felt, colleagues might underestimate. Often,
these doctor-patients hadn’t previously grasped precisely
how distressing side effects could be. For example, these
doctor-patients now became more aware of colleaguesbeing overly ‘‘cavalier’’ about prescribing medications,
minimizing the impact of particular adverse effects (e.g.,
weight gain) that are not medical diagnoses per se (i.e.,
with abnormal lab results that doctors can correct), and that
their colleagues see as being volitional or relatively
unimportant. For example, a psychiatrist who started on
lithium for bipolar disorder, said that, for her, the hardest
aspect of her treatment was weight gain (e.g., ‘‘That’s the
main problem: I’m 50 pounds overweight.’’). She lamented
that her male colleagues in particular insufficiently
appreciated both the importance of weight gain as a side
effect, and its implications (e.g., difficulty finding a
boyfriend).
3.1.6. Interpreting risks as ‘‘Good’’ or ‘‘Bad’’
As patients, these interviewees faced difficult questions
of how to interpret risks, especially those that were less than
50%—that is, present, but not probable. Many sought
subjective interpretations of quantitative data – conclusions
that a particular risk was ‘‘good,’’ ‘‘bad,’’ or ‘‘great,’’ (e.g.,
‘‘do I have to worry or not?’’) – a more definitive status. As
one internist said,
Did a 10% occlusion mean a low or high risk of arrhythmia?
. . .. My big concern is: how bad is my heart disease? . . .
Radiologists say . . . ‘60% occlusion of your left marginal.’ I
have to ask specifically, ‘How likely is a sudden
arrhythmia?’ . . . You expect them to say . . . ‘Most of your
circulation is good . . . We assume it’s dead or injured.’
Thus, despite their training, even these doctors found that,
as patients, they were not always clear what ‘‘the numbers’’
in diagnostic tests meant in terms of clinical implications or
prognoses. These doctor-patients wondered what constituted
‘‘good odds,’’ (e.g., ‘‘There’s no guide to thinking about how
‘good’ odds are not always good,’’) raising questions of how
patients do and should make such determinations—e.g., how
one should confront and respond to a 60% chance of
survival/40% chance of death.
3.1.7. Accepting versus ‘‘defying’’ the odds
As patients, some felt they might ‘‘defy’’ the odds, and be
‘‘lucky,’’ and ‘‘exceptions’’ to the norm. Tendencies toward
optimism and pessimism shaped assessments of risk.
Fatalism arose in part based on seeing patients with similar
diagnoses die (e.g., ‘‘It was a problem seeing a lot of
sickness with patients. So I was pretty pessimistic. I assumed
that in 5 years, I’d be facing severe disease and death’’).
These psychological tendencies could also reflect ingrained
aspects of one’s personality (e.g., ‘‘I’ve always been
‘fatalistic’’’ or ‘‘I tend to be optimistic’’).
Pessimism was seen as having psychological advan-
tages—not being let down. (‘‘A pessimist is never
disappointed, an optimist always is. So prepare for the
worst and you’re pleasantly surprised when it doesn’t
happen.’’) Despite efforts to remain ‘‘objective,’’ and fight
emotional biases in interpretations of data, pessimistic
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Depression appeared to contribute to these interpretations.
One doctor felt he had ‘‘bad luck,’’ (‘‘How could all this
happen? Why me?’’) He had difficulty believing that he had
not been somehow cursed, and he had to remind himself that
chance events occur independently.
Conversely, feelings arose of being able to ‘‘defy the
odds,’’ that could verge on, or reinforce overconfidence and
denial. Some stated that they felt they exercised ‘‘good
denial’’ that was beneficial. But denial can foster
procrastination and at times impeded preventative and other
health behaviors; moreover, the difference between such
‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ denial was not always clear.
In considering risks, some indulged more explicitly in
superstitious or magical thinking, particularly in beliefs that
doctors are somehow immune from disease (e.g., ‘‘Doctor’s
don’t get sick;’’ they ‘‘wear magic white coats.’’ ‘‘You’re
either a doctor or a patient. You can’t be both.’’) Such beliefs
thus concerned not only prognoses, but also etiologies of
disease.
As patients, many of these doctors realized that they often
made decisions based not on ‘‘science,’’ but on emotions—at
times related to acceptance or denial of illness. For example,
an internist with lymphoma received conflicting opinions
from three different experts about treatment. In the end, he
decided not to undergo a bone marrow transplant because he
‘‘just wasn’t emotionally ready’’ to do so—i.e., he hadn’t yet
sufficiently accepted his disease and need for this procedure.
At times colleagues or loved ones challenged these
doctor-patients’ denial, and urged these ill doctors to pursue
or adhere to treatment. Yet interviewees countered these
attempts (e.g., ‘‘Leave me alone. I’m a doctor. I know what
I’m doing.’’).
Nonetheless, worsening medical condition could increase
pessimism. Optimism and denial of illness severity could
remain unabated, however, ‘‘until the very end,’’ altering
only when evidence otherwise became irrefutable.
3.2. Doctor-patients’ experiences as physicians
As doctors, these respondents described, too, several
processes that appeared to shape, as external factors, their
patients’ views and approaches toward risk and benefit
information.
3.2.1. Ordering tests
Frequently, though their awareness increased of the
degree to which patients sought emotional comfort rather
than cognitive understanding alone, these doctors none-
theless felt pressures to provide their own patients with
quantitative data rather than emotional reassurance. Increas-
ingly, they felt ‘‘procedure-oriented,’’ in part because
insurance companies reimbursed more for ‘‘high tech’’
procedures, than ‘‘low tech’’ physical exams, and most
physicians had decreasing amounts of time with patients.
Some felt that interns were particularly ‘‘procedure-oriented’’ because of having less clinical experience, and
hence less confidence in clinical observations and inter-
pretations. Tests provided ready answers, and doctors often
felt more comfortable providing statistics, rather than more
emotionally-charged interpretations (e.g., ‘‘good’’ or
‘‘bad’’).
3.2.2. Doctors under-valuing risks
These doctors felt that they at times underestimated and
under-explained risks to their patients, especially iatrogenic
risks, about which these doctors might feel guilty or
uncomfortable. (e.g., ‘‘Medicine systematically underesti-
mates the complications that we cause.’’) These doctors
often sought to offer patients hope, and implicitly had a
placebo effect. Yet professional training led some to feel
comfortable dismissing small or negligible risks as
‘‘theoretical’’ (i.e., as ones that can be ignored in day-to-
day practice). Still, with their patients, many of these doctors
now, as a result of being patients themselves, felt less likely
to ‘‘blow off mild symptoms’’ such as nausea or fatigue that
might be ‘‘clinically insignificant’’ (i.e., not constituting a
medical diagnosis per se) or ‘‘non-specific,’’ but nonetheless
distress the sufferer.
In interpretations of data to patients, to try to avoid
ambiguity, some of these respondents now, as a result of
their own illness, came to realize, too, the value and potency
of visual images (e.g., radiographic studies of arterial
occlusion), and some showed images to patients more than
before.
Still, these doctors articulated professional barriers to
appreciation of these issues by colleagues. Physician hubris
can lead to conceptualizations of success and failure of
treatment in self-affirming ways. An internist with cancer
now criticized oncologists because of how they judged
‘‘good’’ outcomes and ignored side effects, over-reporting
successes and downplaying failures, defining risks and
benefits differently than patients might. He said:
What they call a success often is not, and is very
ridiculous—they’re giving someone three months more of
a miserable life so that the patient can survive. But the
medications have a lot of side effects that the oncologist
never . . . explained.
4. Discussion and conclusion
4.1. Discussion
Though much research on heuristics and biases has
examined decision-making in isolation, and at a single point
in time, these data suggest that approaches to risks and
benefits are part of processes that transpire over time and are
influenced by several critical, dynamic factors. These
processes are affected, too, by external and internal
variables.
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influencing a patient’s affect, in turn shaping patient
judgments about these risks and benefits [20,21]. Research
in this area has generally been conducted among psychology
students [22]. Yet the data presented here suggest that, at
least among patients with serious illness, the process is more
complex. Affect is also molded by personal experiences and
characteristics, including psychological traits and states
(e.g., underlying tendencies towards optimism or pessi-
mism; and denial or acceptance of disease) that can in turn
vary substantially over the course of an illness. Frequently in
clinical practice, before a physician offers any new set of
statistics, patients have already had symptoms. Difficult
decisions arise of whether to proceed with additional
treatments, given ongoing psychological, medical, and
interpersonal processes (e.g., complex emotions of hope,
optimism, fear, anxiety, depression, denial or acceptance of
illness) that can interact with how statistics are understood.
The data presented here thus suggest that statistical
information about risks and benefits serves as a kind of
Rorschach test that patients view and interpret in a variety of
subjective ways, based on complex internal and external
factors.
These results suggest, too, that physicians have complex
a priori experiences, attitudes, and perspectives that can
shape their approaches toward data in treating patients.
These data parallel the finding that, indeed, physicians’
practice style, e.g., not the prognosis of a case, affects the
number of tests ordered for ICU patients [23].
Though heuristics and biases have been identified that
physicians should avoid, these data illustrate how counter-
vailing pressures arise that increase the use of these
subjective factors. For example, prior studies have demon-
strated that in presentations of data, numerical descriptors
are more effective than verbal descriptors, and less subject to
individual variation in interpretation, suggesting that genetic
counselors and others avoid subjective, verbal expressions of
statistics [3]. Yet even the doctor-patients here often used
and relied on verbal presentations (e.g., about odds being
‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’), and desired such subjective interpreta-
tions of data, though these may be sub-optimal. Further-
more, even these verbal descriptors were not always easy to
request from treating physicians.
The fact that, once becoming ill themselves, these doctor-
patients were surprised by the significance of these issues is
itself surprising, suggesting the extent to which professional
socialization impedes awareness of such concerns. These
doctors’ use of statistics reflects an argot, a coded from of
language with which they feel comfortable, and that reveals
a set of attitudes and approaches toward illness and a process
of probabilistic reasoning instilled in them through their
training, both cognitively and emotionally. This language
provides a sense of certitude, of answers, and of ‘‘covering
themselves’’ against error due to misinterpretation, and
reflects a desire to have control over the uncertainties and
terrors of bad diagnoses. Doctors’ desires to seek testssuggest that at times they may ‘‘hide behind the numbers,’’
reflecting in part the reality that unknown factors may play
key roles in treatment. Their use of statistics suggests, too,
underlying attitudes about how uncertain future events may,
in fact, be ‘‘known.’’ Yet these doctors have been socialized
to such an extent that they do not realize how much their
discourse about statistics can be disconnected from the
‘‘reality’’ of patients’ fears of diseases, and that ultimately,
ambiguity still fills these phrases. Similarly, these doctors
were at times surprised that statistics did not ‘‘shield’’ them
emotionally, and that in several ways the field overrates
medical information. They also realized they had low
sensitivity to side effects that they had been trained to view
as unimportant, and did not themselves experience.
This study has several potential limitations. The sample
size may be small compared to certain studies, though for a
qualitative study of this nature, it is large enough to provide
insights into patterns of issues that emerge. These data are
qualitative rather than quantitative, but as such can shed light
on a range of crucial issues that future quantitative research
can investigate in further detail with a larger sample. Though
many of these doctors had HIV, given the added stigma
involved, they convey several of these themes in bold relief.
Of note, the issues that arose concerning their perspectives
and approaches did not differ significantly from those of
respondents with other kinds of medical disorders. Similar
themes arose across the diseases faced. The themes that
arose concerning risks and benefits also did not appear to
differ based on participants’ professional backgrounds.
These data constitute perceptions of these doctors—I did not
interview these respondents’ own physicians as well to gain
the latter’s perspectives, which can be explored in future
research.
4.2. Conclusion
To optimize clinical care, factors presented here must be
taken into account in clinical practice, medical training, and
future research on medical decision-making. Views and
approaches toward risks and benefits can be profoundly
shaped by many factors, including contexts of dynamic
processes and relationships between doctors and patients.
Challenges emerge concerning how exactly medical
education does and should address these issues—e.g., how
trainees integrate observations of rare but serious complica-
tions with epidemiological data that such extreme compli-
cations are, in fact, uncommon. ‘‘Medical students’ disease’’
has also been described, in which students often believe they
are suffering from diseases about which they are learning,
reflecting their anxiety about these disorders [24]. Yet, in the
context of the present data, ‘‘Medical student’s disease’’ can
be viewed, in part, as a result of a bias due to over-
diagnosing a condition because of anxiety about it, ignoring
baseline rates of conditions. Various adages help trainees
develop necessary intuition for overcoming biases and
heuristics (e.g., ‘‘common things happen commonly’’ and
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notion of ‘‘theoretical’’ risks that are low, but still exist. This
minimization of potential but unlikely risks can help reduce
biases, but can go too far, in that this process can distance
providers from patients’ experiences and perceptions in
confronting risk and benefit information.
The experience of illness made these doctors realize how
much patients hang on little turns of phrase. As patients,
even these interviewees found it hard to provide feedback to
their providers to present risks ‘‘less coldly.’’ Patients face
significant obstacles in attempting to improve physicians’
approaches toward these issues. Hence, medical training
needs to help doctors better understand what factors affect
patients’ experiences of illness and desires concerning risk/
benefit communication. Yet dilemmas remain of how best to
incorporate into education the need for framing and
empathetic presentations of risks.
Clearly, many of these issues in communication about
risk information arise among lay patients as well. These
doctor-patients occupy both roles, however, and can thus
elucidate in bold relief many of these concerns and contrasts
between doctors’ and patients’ perspectives. Their sensi-
tivity to and perceptions of differences between themselves
and lay patients reveal, too, their views of lay patients’
approaches that may inform the care these doctors provide to
others. Future research can probe similarities and differ-
ences with regard to lay patients.
These data can help, too, in future studies of heuristics
and biases – on not only whether these operate, but also how
exactly, and with what variations, given the complex
contexts of interpersonal dynamics between doctors and
patients, and emotional responses to disease. Patients’ use of
heuristics and biases may be informed, e.g., by physicians’
tone, approach and assessments of risk and benefit data as
‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ (e.g., through anchoring of interpretations
of data as described by Tversky and Kahneman) [1].
4.3. Practice implications
These data highlight the need to explain statistics
carefully to patients, assess comprehension of probabilities,
and understand the role of these complex processes and
factors in doctor–patient relationships and communication.
Attention must be paid to not only cognitive processing of
statistics, but also underlying attitudes—e.g., how providers
may see statistics as offering emotional solace and as being
definitive and helpful in and of themselves. Providers should
realize how patients may perceive these numbers differently
than do doctors, and that statistics can raise more questions
and anxieties than they resolve.
The fact that patients seek meaning in statistics (e.g., ‘‘do
I have to worry or not?’’) places pressures on providers, and
no doubt fuels the continued use of verbal expressions,
despite the limitations of these. Such desire for certitude
may also contribute to physicians ordering increasing
numbers of tests and procedures in ways that may not beoptimal, and that these providers need to be as aware of as
possible.
In conveying statistical information, some of the doctors
here suggested that visual images can be powerful ways of
conveying risk and benefit data and thus can potentially be
helpful in communicating risk information. This approach,
and differences in perception between verbal or visual
presentations of data has been explored somewhat [25], but
needs to be further examined in future research.
I confirm that all patient/personal identifiers have been
removed or disguised so the patient/person(s) described are
not identifiable and cannot be identified through the details
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